2012 follows one of the safest years in aviation history since records have been kept. Yet that feat could not have been achieved without the price paid from tragic events 30 years ago and more that will also be commemorated in 2012.

On January 13, 1982, Air Florida flight 90 was to be a typical winter flight to the sunny state of Florida from Washington, D.C. However, there were several circumstances in the works that would place this flight in the annals of aviation history. The area had experienced one of the worst blizzards in memory. Washington National Airport (DCA) had been closed most of the morning but by the afternoon, flights were departing again. One of them was flight 90. But it never made it to its destination. The plane barely lifted off of the ground before entering a stall, hitting a bridge and falling into the icy Potomac River. There were only 4 surviving passengers and one crew member.

Five years earlier, on the other side of the Atlantic on the island of Tenerife, foggy weather, anxious pilots and confused controllers contributed to a series of missteps and communication errors that led to the worst disaster in commercial aviation history. Two 747 jumbo jetliners collided, resulting in 583 deaths.

On the night of December 29, 1972, an Eastern Air Lines L-1011 wide-body jetliner just 4 months old inexplicably plunged into the dark marshes of the Florida Everglades. The cause of the crash of flight 401: a faulty landing gear light that distracted the crew enough to keep them away from their vigilance over the aircraft's autopilot which had accidentally been disengaged. It was the first crash of a wide-body aircraft and at that time, the deadliest in U.S. history. 101 lives were lost.

The accidents of 30, 35 and 40 years ago respectively were noteworthy for their tragic ends, but perhaps more so for the decades-long lessons they taught an industry. When 2011 closed as one of the safest years in commercial aviation on record, one cannot help but look back on the events that led to the safety improvements many flyers take for granted today.

If Air Florida flight 90 were to fly today, it would be de-iced with the latest chemicals, developed in Europe, which can keep aircraft surfaces free of ice for longer periods of time. The 737 operating as flight 90 sat waiting for takeoff for 50 minutes as ice and snow built up on the wings. The anti-icing mechanism for the engines was not activated, even after the crew's use of reverse thrusters to move the plane away from the gate (a common practice at the time) blew ice and snow into the engine housing. This led to false power readings during takeoff that left the plane starving for the extra thrust it needed at a critical phase. Pilots and ground crew today now use the latest weather instruments and know at what key temperatures and conditions de-icing must be used. Additionally, pilots now follow a strict checklist of de-icing and anti-icing procedures and use calculations to determine the maximum amount of time an aircraft can spend on the ground after being sprayed with de-icing fluid.

The accident in the Canary Islands in 1977 involved two 747s operated by Pan American and KLM. The planes had been diverted to Tenerife after a bomb incident at Gran Canaria Airport. The smaller airport known as Tenerife Los Rodeos (Now Tenerife North Airport) was forced to handle wide body aircraft that were forced to park on the taxiway of the single-runway airport. That left the runway as the only means to move aircraft around. When conditions improved, the KLM plane was cleared to taxi down the runway to make a turn at the end for takeoff. The Pan American plane was asked to follow down the same runway but turn off at one of the intersections to allow the KLM aircraft to take off. Due to the heavy fog and some unfortunate miscommunication between the tower and both aircraft, the Pan American plane missed the assigned turnoff while the KLM captain, anxious to make his departure, assumed clearance for takeoff and began his roll. The captain had actually only been given a post-takeoff heading and route and not an actual clearance to take off. The planes struck each other a third of the way down the runway as the Pan American plane tried to get out of the path of the rolling KLM 747.

The disaster led to improvements in taxiway and runway technology that allows controllers to "see" aircraft on the ground better. Protocols have also changed such that controllers and pilots must use specific language when communicating and reaffirming aircraft position. The word "takeoff" in fact is only used upon actual controller clearance and not used in any other instructions or descriptions by the tower. The word "departure" is typically used instead. Crew Resource Management (CRM) has also been a focus of the industry. Where the captain once held irrefutable command in the cockpit, co-pilots are now trained to challenge decisions and actions in the name of safety. CRM could have prevented Eastern 401 from its untimely demise as well. The crew would have had the procedures in place to ensure that the necessary focus on the instruments and aircraft performance was kept at all times while the anomaly with the landing gear indicator was investigated.

The combination of better technology and products; and updated standards, procedures and training has made the industry much safer. Yet there is always room to improve. Today, new technology to prevent runway incursions – the most common breaches of safety – is being implemented at major airports worldwide. The technology not only allows controllers to electronically "see" aircraft at all times and in all conditions, but it also lets properly equipped airplanes to see each other as well.

Despite all the improvements over the last 40 years, one constant still remains. Airplanes are flown by human beings. The training of pilots to adapt to and command such rapidly changing technology remains a critical goal of an industry whose ultimate aim should be to never see another tragedy like those mentioned here today.